A Secure and Privacy-Preserving Targeted Ad-System by Androulaki, Elli & Bellovin, Steven Michael
A Secure and Privacy-Preserving Targeted Ad-System




Abstract. Thanks to its low product-promotion cost and its efficiency, targeted online advertising has
become very popular. Unfortunately, being profile-based, online advertising methods violate consumers’
privacy, which has engendered resistance to the ads. However, protecting privacy through anonymity
seems to encourage click-fraud. In this paper, we define consumer’s privacy and present a privacy-
preserving, targeted ad system (PPOAd) which is resistant towards click fraud. Our scheme is structured
to provide financial incentives to to all entities involved.
1 Introduction
Thanks to its ability to target audiences combined with its low cost, online advertising has become very pop-
ular throughout the past decade. However, current profile-based advertising techniques raise privacy risks
and may contravene users’ expectations, while privacy-preserving techniques, e.g., anonymous browsing, cre-
ate many opportunities for fraud. In this way, security and privacy seem to contradict each other. In this
paper we show that the aforementioned concepts are not mutually exclusive. In particular, we analyze the
privacy concerns raised by online advertising as well as the subsequent security issues, and propose a privacy
preserving set of protocols that provide targeted ads with guaranteed fraud detection.
Privacy Concern: Targeted Ads To increase their banner-ads’ effectiveness, publishers — usually service
oriented websites paid to show advertising spots of other companies’ products — choose their ads based
on users’ browsing activity. More specifically, third party cookies enable special ad networks to track users’
browsing activity across multiple websites, construct very accurate user-profiles [kw06], and target ads ac-
cordingly. These advertising models track users even on sensitive sites, such as medical information websites,
which could result in embarrassing advertisements appearing on other sites and in other contexts. A recent
study [tkh+09] show broad rejection of the concept:
Contrary to what many marketers claim, most adult Americans (66%) do not want marketers to
tailor advertisements to their interests. Moreover, when Americans are informed of three common
ways that marketers gather data about people in order to tailor ads, even higher percentages–between
73% and 86%—say they would not want such advertising.
The study found that over half of Americans felt that the punishment for illegal use of personal information
should be jail time for the executives or that the company “be put out of business”. The privacy issues
become more serious when a conversion takes place, i.e., an online credit-card-based purchase or any activity
which requires a login, thus linking a profile to a particular identity.
Security Concerns: Fraudulent Clicks In the mechanism described before, publishers and ad-networks
get paid by the advertisers in proportion to the number of clicks an advertisment receives from users.
To dishonestly increase their revenue, publishers often fake clicks on ads. The existing privacy-preserving
techniques, such as anonymizing networks, make detection of fraudulent clicks more difficult as all user iden-
tification elements are concealed.
Our Contribution In this paper we present an online target advertising technique combining both pri-
vacy and security, PPOAd. More specifically,
1. we provide a concrete definion of consumers’ privacy
2. we present a privacy-preserving mechanism for the current ad-system infrastructure guaranteeing similar
or better revenues for all the entities involved
3. we present a privacy-preserving mechanism for click-fraud detection and show how this mechanism is
applied in our system, and
4. we based our protocols on ecash and unlinkable credential systems
Organization In the following section we present current ad-systems’ architecture. In sections 3 and 4 we
demonstrate our system’s requirements, threat model and protocols, while in sections 5 and 6, we elaborate
on our system’s security, privacy and innovation w.r.t. the exising work.
2 Targeted-Ads System Architecture
Except for users — the online consumers — in a typical advertising mechanism, the principle parties are
advertisers, ad networks and the publishers. Advertisers are the companies selling and promoting a
particular product or group of products. Publishers are usually service-oriented websites paid to publish
advertisements of advertisers’ products. Ad networks are paid by advertisers to choose the list of advertise-
ments which will appear on publishers and filter the clicks the ads receive. Typical examples of ad-networks
are Doubleclick (owned by Google), Atlas Solutions (owned by Microsoft), Brightcove, and more. It is often
the case that an ad network offers various services and also acts as a publisher.
When a user visits a website(publisher), the browser sends to the publisher some pieces of information
called cookies, which link multiple visits of the same user. In fact, a special type of cookies, the third party
cookies, are sent during the publishers’ visit to the corresponding ad networks, who can now trace user
activity across multiple websites. In this way, especially as ad networks collaborate with many publishers,
they construct very accurate user profiles and target ads accordingly. There are many policies regarding how
ad-networks and publishers are paid. The most popular one is the “cost per click” (CPC), where both parties
are paid by the advertisers in proportion to the number of clicks the latters’ ads receive.
As clearly shown before, targeted ads violate privacy, while CPC payment method motivates many attacks:
publishers may fake clicks on ads they publish to increase their income, while advertisers may generate clicks
on their competitors’ advertisements to deplete the latter’s daily advertising badget. Detection of click-fraud
is currently the responsibility of ad networks. Unfortunately, it is apparent that any conventional mechanism
concealing users’ browsing activity may strenghten click fraud.
3 Requirements-Threat Model
In this section we will define privacy, security and deployability in the context of our system w.r.t. our
system’s requirements and threat model.
3.1 Requirements
Application layer privacy and security are the core requirements in our system. Privacy refers to the user-
protection, while security refers to the protection of the other entities of the system. More specifically, we
define privacy, as the union of:
– User Activity Unlinkability. No system entity should be able to profile a particular honest user, i.e., link
two or more web activities as having originated by the same party, and
– User Anonymity. No system entity should be able to link a particular browsing activity to an identity.
In addition, we define security as the combination of the following properties:
– Correctness. We require that if all parties are honest, advertisers will pay publishers and ad networks in
accordance to the number of clicks their ads have received, while privacy is maintained.
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– Fairness. We require that parties in our system will be paid if and only if they do their duty properly.
– Accountability. Our system should also be accountable, i.e., misbehaving parties should be detected and
identified.
– Unframability. We require that no user can frame an honest user for being responsible for a misbehavior,
i.e., for click-fraud. It is conceivable that strong accountability implies unframability.
– Mis-Authentication. Unless authorized, no user should be able to make use of our system.
We can easily see how the click fraud detection requirement is covered through the fairness and accountability
requirements: fairness requires that publishers should not receive payments for fake clicks on a particular
advertisement, while accountability requires that the attacker is traced.
In addition, we require that our system provide similar ad-efficiency, which would result in similar
profitability to the parties involved. At least as important, it must be deployable. Similar ad-efficiency and,
thus, similar profitability for publishers and ad networks aims to eliminate any monetary constraints against
the adoption of a new system. Deployability is important for the same reasons. We examine deployability from
three aspects: (a) w.r.t. our system’s architecture: not substantial changes in current ad-system architecture
should be required for our protocols to be applied; (b) w.r.t. our threat model, as we will describe later on;
(c) w.r.t. to computation needs.
It is essential to note that both privacy and security provisions are required in the application layer. Also,
we extend the current ad-system architecture with a single entity — which may or may not be distributed
— the User Ad Proxy (UAP), which acts as a mediator between the user and each visiting website.
3.2 Threat Model
Ad-systems’ strong monetary nature, imposes “following the money” the safest way to define our adversaries’
motives and powers. In what follows, we examine our adversary w.r.t. users’ privacy and ad-system’s security.
Publishersmay be “curious” w.r.t. users’ privacy, i.e., they may collaborate with ad networks, advertisers
or other users in order to reveal the identity of a particular user or to link browsing activities of the same user.
In addition, we assume that publishers are “honest and dishonest” w.r.t. the ad networks and advertisers.
In particular, we assume that they do provide correct user-profile related information to the ad networks,
but may attempt to fake clicks to the advertisements they publish in order to increase their revenues.
Ad networks’ revenues depend on the efficiency of the way they list ads in the various publishers, as well
as on their credibility. Ads’ efficiency depends on the accuracy of users-profiling, while credibility depends
of the ad network’s click frauds’ detectability. It is, consequently, reasonable to assume that ad networks are
“honest but curious”, w.r.t. users, while they are “honest” w.r.t. advertisers.
Advertisers are considered to be “curious” w.r.t. the users. In particular, since advertisers have no
direct interaction with them, we believe that they may collaborate with publishers or ad-networks to make
user-profiling more accurate.
UAP is considered to be “honest but curious” w.r.t. the users. More specifically, we assume that is trusted
to perform its functional operations honestly towards the users, but may collaborate with publishers or any
other entity to link separate browsing activities of the same user. We also adopt a economic model so that
UAP does not have a motive to cheat the advertisers.
4 A Privacy preserving Targeted-Ad System
As mentioned in the previous section, we extend the current ad-system architecture with the User Ad
Proxy(UAP). UAP may be considered either as a single entity or as a group of collaborating entities and acts
as a communication mediator between a user U visiting a publisher-website Pub and Pub. It is important to
note that to hide any lower layer information emitted, U interacts with the rest of the system entities through
an anonymizing network, while to automatically erase any cookies acquired and to be able to communicate
with UAP or an UAP-member (if distributed), user-side installs a piece of software, which basically establishes
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Fig. 1. Visiting a Website.
The three core operations of our system: (a) the registration procedure of a user U at PPOAd, during
which U obtains credentials to use the services of UAP, (b) the visit to a publisher, where a PPOAd-user
requests a webpage (fig. 1), and (c) the ad-clicking procedure, where the user clicks on one of the publisher’s
ads (fig. 2). For convenience, we will assume that a user U is interacting with a publisher Pub. In addition,
we will assume a single UAP, while in section 5, we will refer to the distributed UAP case.
Our scheme is based on the use of two types of tokens, issued by the user-UAP collaboration during the
registration procedure: a registration credential regtick, which may authorize U as member of PPOAd multiple
times anonymously and unlinkably, and a wallet with adticks, Wadtick, which will enable U to click on ads.
regticks are blind towards the UAP, their possession can be demonstrated by their owner anonymously and
unlinkably many times, each time resulting in a session-oriented ticket tick. Issued by the valid collaboration
between U and the UAP, adticks are blind towards the UAP and can only be used for a limited number of
times (MaxClicks) strictly by the person who issued them. For security purposes, U’s identity is revealed
in the following two cases: (a) when U attempts to make use of the same adtick more than once, or (b) if
more than MaxClicks adticks of U are used for the same ad. We make use of regticks to achieve privacy w.r.t.
UAP and adticks to achieve privacy and security w.r.t. to all the entities. Both tokens have an expiration
date, so that users need to update their subscription on a monthly basis. In this way, we avoid uneccessary














Fig. 2. Clicking on Ads.
As shown in fig.1, when requesting for a webpage, U sends
to UAP his ad-preferences, demonstrates knowledge of his
regtick and proves that his regtick is not among the black-
listed ones. UAP contacts the website and provides it with
the U-specified ad-preferences. Ads are then shown to U ac-
cordingly.
When U clicks on an ad (see fig.2), he uses one of the
adticks he has obtained at the registration proocedure. The
adtick is then linked to the following combination:
{publisher || ad network || product-serial},
which identifies the particular ad. If U clicks intentionally on
the same ad more than a pre-defined number of times using
his adtick s, he will risk his privacy, as his identity will be
revealed. However, U can choose instead to open an account
for clicking on that particular ad, which will enable the ad
network to decide whether series of U’s clicks on that ad are
legal or fraudulent. If classified as malicious, U’s membership credential will be blacklisted.
As we will see later on, we use the blacklistable version of unlinkable credential system of [taks07] for
the registration credentials regticks and the accountable ecash [jcl06] scheme for adticks.
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In what follows, we will elaborate on the building blocks we used to construct our protocols and based
on them we will proceed with the detailed description of our scheme.
4.1 Building Blocks
In this section, we present our primitives: group, blind signature schemes, blacklistable anonymous credential
systems as well as digital cash systems.
Ecash An E-Cash [chl05][jcl06] system consinsts of three types of players: the bank, users and merchants.
The input and output specifications of the basic operations are as follows. For convenience, we will assume
that the operations take place between a merchant M, a user U and the Bank B.
• (pkB, skB)← EC.BKeyGen(1k, params) and (pkU, skU)← EC.UKeyGen(1k, params), which are the key generation
algorithm for the bank and the users respectively.
• 〈W,>〉 ← EC.Withdraw(pkB, pkU, n) [U(skU),B(skB)]. In this interactive procedure, U withdraws a wallet W of n
coins from B.
• 〈W ′, (S, pi)〉 ← EC.Spend(pkM, pkB, n) [U(W ),M(skM)]. In this interactive procedure, U spends a digital coin with
serial S from his wallet W to M. When the procedure is over, W is reduced to W ′, M obtains as output a coin
(S, pi), where pi is a proof of a valid coin with a serial number S.
• 〈>/⊥, L′〉 ← EC.Deposit(pkM, pkB) [M(skM, S, pi), B(skB, L)]. In this interactive procedure, M deposits a coin
(S, pi) into its account in the bank. If this procedure is successful, M’s output will be > and the bank’s list L of
the spent coins will be updated to L′.
• (pkU, ΠG) ← EC.Identify(params, S, pi1, pi2). When the bank receives the two coins with the same serial number
S and validity proofs pi1 and pi2, it executes this procedure, to reveal the public key of the violator accompanied
with a violation proof ΠG.
• >/⊥ ← EC.VerifyGuilt(params, S, pkU, ΠG). This algorithm, given ΠG publicly verifies the violation of pkU.• {(Si, Πi)}i ← EC.Trace(params, S, pkU, ΠG, D, n). This algorithm provides the list of serials Si of the ecoins a
violator pkU has issued, with the corresponding ownership proofs Πi.• >/⊥ ← EC.VerifyOwnership(params, S,Π, pkU , n). This algorithm allows to publicly verify the proof Π that a coin
with serial number S belongs to a user with public key pkU .
[jcl06] is a money-laundering prevention version of [chl05], where anonymity is revoked when the
spender spends more coins to the same merchant than a spending limit. In this case ecoins are upgraded
to C = (S, V, pi), where V is a merchant-related locator, while EC.Identify and EC.VerifyGuilt procedures are
upgraded to the DetectViolator and VerifyViolation to support the extended violation definition.
Security Properties: (a) Correctness. (b) Balance. No collection of users and merchants can ever spend more
coins than they withdrew. (c) Identification of Violators. Given a violation and the corresponding proofs
of guilt, the violator’s public pkU key is revealed such that EC.VerifyViolation accepts. (d) Anonymity of
users. The bank, even when cooperating with any collection of malicious users and merchants, cannot learn
anything about a user’s spendings other than what is available from side information from the environment.
(e) Exculpability. An honest user U cannot be accused for conducting a violation such that EC.VerifyViolation
accepts. (f) Violators’ Traceability. Given a violator Uwith a proof of violation ΠG, this property guarantees
that EC.Trace will output the serial numbers of all coins that belong to U along with the corresponding
proofs of ownership, such that for each one of them VerifyOwnership accepts.
Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials (BLAC) The entities in the blacklistable credential system
BLAC of [taks07] are the Group Manager GM, a set of service providers SPs and users. The procedures
supported are the following:
• 〈gpk, gsk〉 ← BLAC.Setup[GM(1k)]. This algorithm generates a group public key gpk and the GM’s secret group
information gsk .
• 〈credU, JLogU〉 ← BLAC.Register(gpk)[U,GM(gsk)]. When this interactive registration ends, U has obtained his
membership credential credU.• 〈>/⊥〉 ← BLAC.Authenticate(gpk) [U(credU), SP(BL)]. In this interactive procedure, U proves to SP that he is a
valid (non-blacklisted) member of the group.
• 〈BL′〉 ← BLAC.BLAdd[SP(BL)], where a service provider ads a credential (ticket) to the blacklist BL.
• 〈tick〉BLAC.BLExtract[SP(BL)], where SP extracts an element from the blacklist.
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• 〈BL′〉 ← BLAC.BLRemove[SP(BL)], where SP removes a credential from the blacklist.
Security Properties: (a) Correctness. (b) Mis-authentication Resistance. No unregistered user or collection
of unregistered users should be able to authenticate themselves. (c) Blacklistability. SPs may blacklist any
misbehaving user of the system and restrict him from any ability of authenticating himself. (d) Anonymity.
SPs may only learn whether a user is blacklisted or not; no identification information may be leaked. (e)
Non-framability. An honest user should never be blocked from access.
Group Signature Schemes (GSS) In a typical GSS, there is a group manager (GM), the group-members,
who act as signers (let each be S) and produce signatures on behalf of the group. The procedures supported
are the following:
• (gpk, gsk)← GS.Setup(1k). This algorithm generates a group public key gpk and the GM’s secret group information
gsk .
• 〈bguskS, JLogS〉 ← GS.Join(gpk)[S,GM(gsk)]. When this interactive join procedure ends, an S obtains a secret
signing key bguskS, and the GM (group manager) logs the join transcript in the database D.• σ ← GS.Sign(gpk, bguskS,m). This algorithm generates a group signature on a message m.• 〈>/⊥〉 ← GS.Verify(gpk,m, σ). This is a verification algorithm.
• Ms← GS.Open(gsk, σ,D). With this algorithm the GM determines the identity of the group member who generated
the signature σ.
Security Properties: (a) Anonymity. Given a signature and two members, one of whom is the originator, the
adversary can identify its originator among the group members no better than randomly. (b) Unforgeability.
The adversary cannot produce a valid group signature without owning group membership information. (c)
Non-framability. The adversary cannot create a valid group signature that opens to another group member.
4.2 The PPOAd Protocol in detail
Setup. All entities run a key generator algorithm (EC.UKeyGen) to generate their signature key-pairs and
publish their public information.
UAP runs EC.BKeyGen twice to establish the two accountable ecash schemes, which will be used for
adticks(see, section 4.1). In addition to its keys’ generation, UAP runs the BLAC.Setup procedure of the
blacklistable anonymous credential (BLAC) scheme (see, section 4.1) for user-registration purposes, while it
maintains two blacklists: the TempBL, where it stores the credentials in question, and, the PermBL, which is
the official blacklist of the system.
Each ad network AdNet runs GS.Setup to generate the administration information for the group of pub-
lishers GAdNet it provides ads with: {gpkAdNet , gskAdNet}. In response, each publisher collaborating with
AdNet, runs GS.Join with AdNet to obtain membership in GAdNet .
Registration (PPOAd.Register) This is the case where a user U registers to UAP such that the former
makes use of PPOAd’s privacy services. PPOAd.Register consists of the following steps:
1. U provides the UAP with a piece of identification information. This can be a credit card, which will be
used to pay U’s subscription. U runs EC.UKeyGen to issue a signature key pair (pkU, skU), with he will
be identified in the PPOAd system.
2. U and UAP collaborate in a BLAC.Register procedure, where U’s credential regtickU is issued. regtickU is
blind towards UAP.
3. U and UAP collaborate in a BLAC.Authenticate procedure, so that UAP obtains a transcript of the
regtickU authentication phase, memU. Note that the memU which was obtained by UAP in this way,
serves blacklistability pursposes and cannot be linked to later authentications of U through regtickU.
4. U and UAP collaborate in two EC.Withdraw procedure, for the former to obtain two wallets Wf,lads of
accountable ecash each corresponding to the two different settings of accountable ecash established in
the setup phase.
5. UAP stores in its membership database the new user’s entry: {U, pkU,memU}, while it provides U with
a signed proof of payment: PaymRec = SigUAP(timestamp,U).
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In what follows, we will assume that a user U visits a website Pub, which is in contract with a number of
ad networks Adv1, . . . ,Advm, who provide the website with ads.
Ad-targeting (PPOAd.Target) This procedure involves the ad-targeting taking place when U visits Pub.
1. User Authorization: U interacts with UAP in a BLAC.Authenticate procedure to authenticate himself as a
non-blacklisted member of the PPOAd system. In this procedure U demonstrates knowledge — in a zero
knowledge fashion — of his membership credential regtickU. Let AuthT be the corresponding transcript
of U-UAP interactions.
2. tick issue phase: UAP issues a signed, dated permission tick, which will enable U to access the website
requested. tick may have the form of
tick = SigUAP(timestamp,AuthT).
3. Preferences setup. In this phase, U sets up his ad-preferences and sends them to the UAP. UAP then
sends the webpage http request with U’s preferences. As we will see later, the preferences-related info
provided to UAP does not enable U activity-tracking neither by the UAP, nor by the requested website.
4. Targeting. Ad networks, who receive U’s preferences as coming from UAP itself, process the ad-preferences
and provide Pub with the corresponding list of ads.
5. Pub Visit. U provides tick to Pub and the Pub-webpage is presented to U.
Ad-clicking (PPOAd.Adclick) This operation refers to the case, where U has already visited Pub and clicks
on one of the ads an ad network AdNeti provided to Pub. The series of interactions involve the following:
1. Clicked Ad’s website request. Pub sends the ad-click information to the clicked ad’s website, which is
essentially one of the advertisers in contract with AdNeti. Let Advj be the one. The ad-click information
includes AdNeti, Pub, AuthT and a timestamp. Note that this step is currently performed in ad-systems
and serves billing and user-profiling purposes. Note that AuthT can be considered as a session identifier
for the U.
2. AdID construction. In this phase the ad network, advertiser and clicked-product’s identifier is popularized
to U. The complete ad’s identity would then be the following:
AdID = {Pub||AdNeti||product ID},
where we assume that the same products of different advertisers have different identification num-
bers. As we will discuss in section 5, in addition to the AdID, an AdID-related key-pair is constructed
(pkAdID, skAdID).
3. adtick-based Authorization. Let MaxClicks be the number of times an honest user usually clicks on an
ad.1 Based on how many times U has — over all his browsing activity — clicked on that particular AdID,
we have three adclick protocols of U-AdNeti interaction:
(a) If U has clicked on the same AdID fewer than MaxClicks times, he and AdNeti collaborate in EC.Spend
procedure, so that U spends one of his Wiads digital coins to the AdID related key-pair.
(b) If U has clicked exactly MaxClicks times to the same AdID, he and AdNeti commit in a similar
(as before) EC.Spend procedure for one of the coins of U’s Wlads wallet. In addition, U and AdNeti
collaborate in an EC.KeyGen procedure for U to create an account (pkAdIDU , sk
AdID
U ) within AdNeti
for that particular AdID. AdNeti stores {pkUAdID,AuthT,AdID} to its database.
(c) If U has clicked on the same AdID more than MaxClicks times, he has already been issued an AdID-
account. Thus, he demonstrates knowledge of skAdIDU . In this way, his behavior towards this AdID
will be traceable.
We can see that a user trying to attack an advertiser using PPOAd will eventually have his click-activity
for that particular ad traced. In this way, AdNeti may have all the information necessary to characterize
the sequence of clicks on that AdID as malicious or benign. Different CPC rates may apply in this case.
1 This number varies from two to four, depending on how interesting that product is, and should be defined after
suitable research.
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4. If everything is fine, the the Advj website is presented to U.
If at any point of the procedure, U declines to cooperate, AdNeti or Pub report AuthT to UAP, who can then
run BLACK.BLAdd on TempBL to put a temporary hold on regtickU which corresponds to AuthT. Note that
thanks to the properties of BLAC system adopted, UAP does not need to know the user U or his regtickU.
On the other hand, if U tries to click on the same AdID more MaxClicks times using his adticks, he will need
to spend more than MaxClicks coins of his Wiads wallet or more than one coin of his W
l
ads to the same AdID.
Because of the accountable ecash properties, this will result in revocation of pkU, while regtickU will be
immediately blacklisted (through memU).
Update Membership (PPOAd.UpdateMembership) To enforce payment of its registered members’ monthly
contribution, at the end of this prefixed period UAP changes its credentials’ parameters. To continue mak-
ing use of PPOAd’s services, users contact UAP by providing the corresponding identification and payment
(most recent PaymRec) information. Also, each user and UAP commit in a BLAC. Authenticate protocol, for
the former to prove that his old credential is not among the blacklisted ones. If a user’s UregtickU is not
blacklisted, U pays his monthly contribution, issues a new regtickU and receives new PaymRec. On the other
hand, if regtickU is blacklisted or U does not pay, his old credential will not be up to date and thus will not
be possible for him to use PPOAd’s services.
5 System Considerations
In this section, we will elaborate on the security and privacy properties of our system, as well as on other
practical issues.
User-ad-preferences play an important role for our system’s ad-efficiency. As mentioned in previous sec-
tion, after his registration to the PPOAd (PPOAd.Register) the user obtains and installs software to handle
the PPOAd’s interactions, which also includes a user-preferences-related section (as the one in [cdfp03]).
Depending on how targeted wishes his ads to be, the user creates many partial profiles by choosing various
types of products he is interested in and the particular products in each category individually that may be
of his interest. When the user visits a website and after the PPOAd.Authenticate phase — the user-software
obtains the classification of the requested website and forwards to UAP the corresponding partial profile.
Assuming that the lower layer information, i.e., consumer’s machine’s IP is hidden towards the UAP, because
of the BLAC system unlinkability property, the latter cannot link the partial profiles of the same user. In
addition, being partial (related to the website), while prone to change at any time, the same partial profile
may commonly be met across different users and will not be enough to link browsing activities of the same
consumer across different websites.
AdID key-pair construction. To preserve security and privacy, it is essential that each AdID-combination:
{Pub, AdNet, productID}, where Pub is the visited website, AdNet is the ad network providing the ad and
productID the serial of the product, is assigned a different key-pair. To achieve this, AdNet constructs AdID’s
key-pair by contributing to the key-generation algorithm a pre-specified hash of the following quantity:
gpkPub||pkAdNet ||productID, where gpkPub is the Pub’s public information in the GAdNet , and pkAdNet the
public key of AdNet. In this way, the same key will be generated for the same AdID, without the need of
precalculating it, while the probability that the same key is generated for two AdIDs is negligible.
Distributed UAP. If PPOAd is intended for large-scale use, it is important that UAP’s functionality is
distributed. This can be achieved through the use of blind group and group signatures, where UAP-related
blind and plain signatures were used. In addition, depending on our privacy and computation efficiency re-
quirements, we may group UAPs serving users of the same geographical area together. In this way, operations
such as validity checks will be accelerated.
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Privacy. Assuming that the partial profiles reveal nothing w.r.t. the consumer, and that user-cookies are
succesfully erased through the PPOAd-software installed, privacy in our system is guaranteed through the
ecash and BLAC systems’ security properties (see, section 4.1 and 4.1). In particular, consumers’ anonymity
and activity unlinkability is provided directly via the anonymity and unlinkability properties of the black-
listable anonymous credentials used in PPOAd.Register and PPOAd.Target procedures and anonymity and
unlinkability properties of the ecash schemes used in PPOAd.Adclick procedure. Note that even when a con-
sumer clicks on the same AdID more than MaxClicks times, the former’s behavior towards that particular
AdID is only traceable (when and how often the consumer clicks on it) and not his overall browsing activity.
Security. Each part of PPOAd’s security is satisfied. Correctness is guaranteed through the correctness of
the schemes adopted. Mis-authentication resistance is achieved through the corresponding property of the
blacklistable anonymous credential system used at the authorization phase of our protocols. Unframability
is guaranteed through the combination of the mis-authentication resistance property and the ecash nature of
the adticks: being unforgeable and ecash-based, only an authenticated PPOAd-user who issued the adticks can
use them successfully. Fairness and accountability are achieved also through the accountable ecash security
properties (see, section 4.1): a user trying to click at the same ad many times will either have his public
key revealed or his click-activity w.r.t. that ad traced. If the latter is the case, and the user is classified as
malicious, he will be automatically be blacklisted and his ad-clicks ignored.
A Market Model. Threats towards security continue to exist. In our threat model, we assumed that
UAP restricts users to a single registration to PPOAd. However, it is conceivable that in the real world,
corrupted UAP entities — since they are paid by the users — may be tempted to issue multiple accounts
to the same party, which would enable the latter to forge clicks without limit. It is thus critical that we
offer monetary incentive for the system entities to behave according to our threat model. In addition, since
targeted advertising is already very profitable, we need to create incentives to direct it as we propose. In this
section we elaborate on a market model towards for both cases.
In response to our threat model issue, we require that UAP entities are paid by both, the user — through
his PPOAd-subscription — and by the ad networks who also benefit from click-fraud. Wanting to maintain
their clientele, UAP will be forced to be “honest” in their functional operations towards both entities: users
and ad networks.
As far as the PPOAd application is concerned, ad networks already have incentives to participate in
our system: through the PPOAd click-fraud detection mechanism, ad networks’ fraud detection ability —
thus their credibility — will be enhanced. In addition, despite our privacy provisions, ad networks may still
target ads even more effectively: the targeting procedure is now based on partial profiles provided by the
user himself, while it is likely that their audience is extended with users who — strictly for privacy reasons
— had so far removed ads from their browsers. Being offered better click-fraud detection rates, advertisers
would also benefit from PPOAd.
6 Related Work
Fraudulent Click detection has been attempted in the past. In particular, Jakobsson, MacKenzie and Stern
in [jms99] introduce an ad system where advertisers (in their system are called merchants) utilize e-coupons
to detect malicious actions. However, in their scheme they do not deal with privacy the same way we defined
it.
Combining targeted ads and privacy has been attempted in the past. Juels in [j01] has suggested a target
ad technique with the use of third parties, the nogotiants, which would update a bulletin board with users’
ad-preferences. Although perfectly secure in terms of privacy, they do not deal with our second security
consern. Claessens and Diaz in [cdfp03] in fact suggested a more lightweight privacy preserving target ad
system, where users would be grouped in terms of profiles for them to be presented with ads. V. Toubiana et
al. in [tnb+09] have transfered the targeting mechanism to a browser extension, in a private way towards ad
networks and publishers. However, though there are some suggestions, they do not consider click fraud. To
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privately target ads, iPrivacy [ss01] ecommerce system, had their clients obtain anonymous email accounts
— held by the company itslelf or the banks — bound to specific advertising profiles; in this way users only
receive ads of their interests.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed privacy and security in the area of online targeted advertising. In particular,
we provided a set of protocols providing targeted ads with similar efficiency as current systems and in a
privacy preserving way. At the same time, the privacy provided in our system is conditional, guaranteed only
for honest users.
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